


Focusing DoD Security Cooperation to Build Partner Capacity


Dr. Jennifer D.P. Moroney

RAND Corporation




Agenda

- Developments in Building Partner Capacity
- Overview of Key RAND BPC Study Findings
- Focusing Security Cooperation to BPC




BPC Developments: An Overview

- Concept of Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) stems from 2004 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
- BPC Roadmap developed to ensure follow through of QDR recommendations
 - Includes building a national security university, expanding DoD training programs to civilians, reforming foreign assistance, etc.
- BPC addresses QDR decisions; security cooperation addresses full range of DoD international activities
- Proposal to Congress: FY08 Building Partnership Capacity Act
 - Some examples include:
 - Establish permanent train and equip authorities
 - New authorities for interoperability
 - Reforming the DoD Regional Centers




Why Should DoD Focus Security Cooperation to BPC?

- To enable partners to secure their own territories, curtail illicit trafficking, etc.
- To increase a partner's ability to prevent local frictions from becoming full-blown crises requiring U.S. intervention
- To free up U.S. forces for other missions
- To enable partners to work alongside the U.S. in coalition operations
 - SSTR types of missions are ideal for many partners
 - Capabilities built should focus on improving compatibility with the U.S. and/or neighboring countries to build *regional* capacity



Agenda


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Security Cooperation Assumptions


For RAND's Security Cooperation work:

1. Security cooperation can provide partners with capability for domestic or regional application
2. Security cooperation can build partner capabilities to support coalition operations
3. Prior support for U.S.-led coalition operations may be indication of shared national interests
4. Partner capabilities are more likely to be sustained if they benefit both partner and U.S.
5. Partner is more likely to be interested in developing and sustaining capability if it has domestic application and/or considered "prestigious"




Lessons from Train and Equip Programs (I)

- Planning and Funding
 - Consider multiple sources of funding at outset
 - Plan for the long-term regarding equipment provided
 - Sequence training / equipment and ensure suitability to environment
 - Train fully-manned units where possible; recurring training requirements critical
 - Measures of effectiveness needed for program as a whole, not just specific activities or phases
 - Manage partner expectations throughout
 - Greater U.S. and partner interagency efforts to improve sustainment of capabilities built
 - Coordination with key donors can improve sustainability; establish donor clearinghouse early on
 - Ensure human rights vetting for ALL participants



Lessons from Train and Equip Programs (II)

- Execution
 - Army conventional forces underutilized in TEP
 - Programs executed by U.S. military resulted in improved mil-to-mil relationship
 - Emphasis of regional and multilateral activities and common doctrine can help build regional capacity
 - Common SOPs in bilateral TEPs can improve regional interoperability
 - Consider establishing an Army unit specifically for training foreign forces




GTEP/SSOP Key Findings - Implementation

- Consider simultaneous training at all levels
 - Focus on CO level was problematic because BN and BDE level coordination was omitted
 - Training BN without training higher staffs inhibits unit cohesiveness
- Conduct activities that encourage regular interface of HN interagency to facilitate coordination
 - Georgian Border Guards and MOI training forced interaction of other GoG security services with MOD
- Train fully-manned units, ensure partner has plan to sustain
- Encouraging trained forces to host multilateral exercises can improve regional interoperability
- Consider establishing basic training course to ensure replacement soldiers
- Where possible, train to UN standards to improve ability of forces to deploy regional and multilateral operations




GTEP/SSOP Key Findings - Coordination

- Create and maintain forward C2 elements for TEP
 - MARFOREUR as lead component created a C2 element at Krtsanisi (Georgia) to draw together support elements
- Involve partner CHOD as close to outset as possible
- Ensure early DSCA involvement and discuss timelines and requirements with desk officers
- TEP commander needs to closely coordinate with ODC/OMC to link to COCOM pol-mil intent
- Donors can be useful at filling gaps in TEP requirements
 - Each GTEP BTNs brought back for 3 weeks of BTN training while UK BMATT trained BTNs soldiers
 - Each BTN given a week-long PSO scenario as culminating event, which greatly maximized impact of U.S. training




Key Considerations for Investing in Train and Equip

- What kinds of capabilities would the U.S. like to see partners develop?
 - For example, some gapped capabilities in the U.S. Army include IED detection, HUMINT, and engineering
- What is the best approach selecting good candidate partner countries?
 - How do we know that countries will not use capabilities we help them to build for the wrong purposes?
- Are the capabilities interesting for the partners? Why?
 - Are they useful at home and abroad? Are they prestigious?
- What is the level of effort required (cost, complexity?) Is this a cost-effective investment for U.S.?
- To what extent has partner provided forces or other direct support to U.S.-led coalition operations in the past?





Selecting Capabilities: Determine Level of Effort Required





Selecting Capabilities: Determine Level of Importance to U.S. and Partner






Learning Lessons from Coalition Operations: The Case of MND-CS (I)

- Force Generation
 - **ROE interpretation**
 - **Prepared for PK mission only**
 - Monetary motivations
 - Lessons learned process (less problematic in NATO allies)
 - Sub-optimal use of NCOs
- Command and Control
 - **Dual chains (MND and National)**
 - Setting up base commanders
- Communications
 - **Incompatible comms**
 - **Lack of effective English Language capability**
- Intelligence Sharing
 - **Dual chains and backchannels**
 - **One way intel sharing**
 - **Lack of adequate HUMINT/SIGINT and analysis capabilities**
 - Small size of the intelligence staff in the MND
 - Unclear about procedures for sharing intel with locals (i.e., Iraqis)

Mission Failure

Mission Impact

Other Problems




Learning Lessons from Coalition Operations: The Case of MND-CS (II)

- Operations
 - **National caveats**
 - **Experience with OPORDS, FRAGOS and access**
 - **Lack of familiarization with NATO standards and terminology**
 - **Aversion to risk in organizational style**
 - **Unfamiliar with GPS**
 - **Detainee ops**
- PA/Civil-Mil/PsyOps
 - **Experience in operational context**
- CSS
 - **Over reliance on US logistics support**
 - **Technical repair and maintenance**
 - **Incompatibilities in consumables (fuel)**
 - **Accountability**

Mission Failure


Mission Impact

Other Problems




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To Sum Up...

- COCOMs need to plan, resource, and exercise to ensure sustainment of capabilities
- COCOMs need to communicate their requirements for security cooperation to the Services
- Consider building capabilities that are of interest to both U.S. and the partner, and require a lower level of effort
- Assess train and equip programs as a whole, not just as individual activities or phases
- Capture, analyze, validate and disseminate lessons from recent coalition operations; feed lessons back into planning process
- Ensure that lessons inform the security assistance community



QUESTIONS?